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ABSTRACT
This paper formulates and tests the hypothesis that the categories
unemployedand out of the labor force are behaviorally distinct labor force
states. Our empirical results indicate that they are. In the empirically
relevant range the exit rate from unemployment to employment exceeds the
exit rate from out of the labor force to employment. This evidence is shown
to be consistent with a simple job search model of productive unemployment
with log concave wage offer distributions. We prove that if unemployed workers
receive job offers more frequently than workers out of the labor force, and
if wage offer distributions are log concave, the exit rate from unemployment
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There is considerable controversy over the issue of whether or not the
categories unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally distinct labor
force states. This issue is particularly relevant in the study of the labor
market dynamics of youth.
Given the range of nonmarket options available to many youths, and
given practices of many state unemployment compensation programs which effectively
limit the eligibility for unemployment compensation of most youths,.it seems
especially likely that there is no distinction between unemployment and out
of the labor force status for young people. Clac and Summers (1982) and
Ellwood (1982) have recently made this claim. They argue that the empirical
distinction between reported "unemployment" and reported "out of the labor
force" is so arbitrary that it is of little or no analytical value.
This point would seem to have some merit after examining the official
Current Population Survey definition of unemployment which defines those
individuals as unemployed "who had no employment during the survey week, were
available for work, and (1) had engaged in any specific job seeking activity
within the past four weeks, or (2) were waiting to be called back to a job
from which they had been laid off, or (3) were waiting to report to a new
wage or salary job scheduled to start within the following 30 days." Because
there is no stipulation as to the quality or quantity of searches made within
the month, the unemployment—out of the labor force distinction may be of little
value in predicting employment probabilities for the nonemployed.2
On the other hand, theoretical models suggest that being unemployed
as opposed being to out of the labor force describes different behavior. For
example, in search theory (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1978)) a key difference
between unemployed individuals and those out of the labor force is that the
former are at an interior point with respect to the amount of time they devote
to search while the latter are at a corner and spend no time searching. In
these models, separate behavioral equations characterize the reemployment
probabilities from these two states.
In this paper we test the hypothesis that the classificationsunemployed
(u) and out of the labor force (o) are behaviorally meaningless distinctions.
We reject this hypothesis. Distinct behavioral equationsgovern transitions
from out of the labor force to employment (e) and fromunemployment to
employment.
The idea underlying our test is as follows: controlling for both
observed and unobserved individual differences in explanatoryvariables, if
the escape rate from unemployment to employment(hue) is the same as the
escape rate from out of the labor force to employment (h), the origin state
(u or o) is irrelevant in determining the rate at which individuals leave
nonemployment to enter employment. In a simple three state Markov model, this
test is equivalent to testing the proposition that the two nonemployment states
can be aggregated into a single state resulting in a two state Markov model
for employment and nonemployrnent.
We find that in the empirically relevant range the exit rate from
the state of unemployment to the employed state exceeds the exit rate from
the tate of out of the labor force to the employed state. Thisfinding is
consistent with versions of a traditional job search model in which the rate3
of arrival of wage offers for the unemployed exceeds the rate of arrival of
wage offers for those out of the labor force. It is also consistent with versions
of a job search model with a positive interest rate in which the mean of the
wage offers for the unemployed exceeds the mean of the wage offers for those
out of the labor force. Thus the empirical evidence reported in this paper is
broadly consistent with versions of search theory in which unemployment is a
state that facilitates the job search process.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we
exposit our test in a simple setting. in section 3, we describe the more general
econometric specification used to perform our test. Section 4 presents empirical
results and our interpretation of them. Section 5 contains concluding rmarks.
In an Appendix, we present a new sufficient condition for the exit rate from
unemployment to be an increasing function of the rate of arrival of job offers.4
2. Testing the Behavioral Distinction Between Unemployment and Out
Of the Labor Force
To motivate our test, we consider two cases)' In the first case, the
probability density function of employment spell durations in g(t) where
tdenotes the length of the employment spell. The probability that aperson
terminating employment classifies himself as u or o is determined by
tossing a coin that comes up u fraction r of the time and comes up o
fraction 1—it of the time. Once acquired the person keeps these labels as
long as he is nonemployed so that there is no direct switching between u
and o states. The density function of duration times in nonemployment is




where G(t) is the cumulative distribution function of nonemployment
durations. The joint probability of unemployment classification and
nonemployment duration t is
itg(t)
with associated hazard function
To simplify the exposition we assume that agents are homogeneous throughout
this section. This assumption is not essential and is not used in performing
the empirical work reported in Section 4.5
h =h
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The hazard rate will be the same for the two nonemployment states o and u.
In the second case considered here, individuals are allowed to switch
their reported nonemployment status randomly. By this we mean that initial
nonemployment classification is governed as before by a toss of a coin and
that within a spell of nonetnployment individuals switch randomly between
o and u. The continuous time analogue of discrete time independent Bernoulli
trials is an exponential waiting time model (Cox (1962)). Write the hazard
for durations from o to u as h and the hazard from u to o as h ou uo
The density of time spent going from o to e(toe) is
h exp —(h +h )t oe oeou oe6




Individuals may change between reported nonemployment states for any reason.
Allthatis required for the origin state (o or u) to be irrelevant for
characterizing transitions from nonemployment to employment is for hoe =h.
Note that in both cases, conditioning on o or u eliminates the
classification probability parameter iT.Thus the test advocated in this paper
is valid even if individuals systematically report themselves as o or u
and the reporting probabilities are functions of explanatory variables.
The condition h h is also the requirement that must be satisfied oe ue
in a Markov model to aggregate o and u into a single state n, and for the
resulting two state model for e and n to be a properly defined Markov model.
To demonstrate this it is most convenient to work with the state probability
representation of the three state Markov model (see, Tumaet. al, (1978));
Flinn and Hec1ian (l982a)). Define P.(t) as the probability that state j
is occupied at time t and P. Ct) as the instantaneous rate of change of this
probability. Then
P Ct) —(h + h ) h h P Ct)
e eu eo oe ue e
P(t) h -(h + h ) h P Ct)
eo oe ou uo o
P (t) h h -(h + h ) P Ct) u eu ou ue uo u7
or
P3(t) =AP(t)
in matrix notation where thesuperscript 3 indicates a three state model.
Note that the rank of A is atmost 2.
In order to aggregate o andu into a two state model defined in







where P(t) =P(t)+ P(t). In matrix notation thetwo state model may be
written as P2(t) =BP2(t).The rank of B is 1. For thisto be an
equivalent representation of the threestate model, a necessary condition is
that rank (A) rank (B) =1.A necessary and sufficient condition isthat
h =h h .Sufficiencymaybechecked by direct Substitution into A. oe ue ne
This interpretation of our test isalso informative in that it makes
precise the sense in which o andu are irrelevant. Aggregating o and
u into a single state for thepurpose of statistical analysis does not alter
the Markov property of the model.The rate at which individuals leavenon—
employment to enter employment does notdepend on which nonemployment state8
individuals occupy.
It is tempting to extend this type of reasoning to considertransitions
from employment to the twononemploymentstates. Thus it might be argued that
if u andoare irrelevant distinctions, the rate of transition from e
to u (h )wouldbe the same as the rate of transition from e too eu
eo This argument is correct only if the probability of exiting from
employmentto unemployment (ri)equals the probability of exiting from employment
to out of the labor force (1—ri)so
•fl= 1—ri=-
If8e(te) is the density of employment length durations with associated
hazard rate h (t ),thehazard rate for transitions from e to u is e e
heu e
while the hazard rate for e to o transition is
h (1 —ri)h
Obviously h + heo =
heby the properties of conditional probabilities.
But unless Ti =1—ri=1/2,h h. We have no theory of ri.Even if
reporting oneself as unemployed is strictly a matter of tossing a coin,
nothing requiresri =1/2.However, if information is available on the
fraction of employment spells that are immediatelyfollowed by unemployment,
it is possible to obtain a consistent estimate of and to test the
proportionality hypothesis that
(2.2) h /h =ri/i—n eu eo
Assuming r is constant in the population. If riis a function of observed
and unobserved heterogeneity components, a more complicated but still straightforward
estimation scheme is required.9
3. Econometric Implementation of the Test
In order to test the hypothesis that unemployment and out of the labor
force are not behaviorally distinct labor market states we first specify a
parametric form for the hazard functions (h.k, jk; j,k =e,o,u)on which
the test is based. We have adopted a general functional form for the hazard
functions in order to minimize the possibility of spuriously rejecting the
two 3tat model because of model misspecification. For a detailed
consideration of the econometric issues which arise in the estimation of
duration data models, the reader is referred to Flinn and Hec1nan (1982a).
In this section we sketch the econometric specification employed in performing
our proposed test.
Since a hazard function is a conditional probability density function,
a requirement of any econometric specification is that for all possible values
of the parameters and both observed and unobserved heterogeneity the hazard
be nonnegat±ve. The econometric specification adopted in this paper imposes
nonnegativity.
A hazard function associated with a particular probability density'
is said to exhibit positive, no, or negative duration dependenceaccording
to whether
h(t) >t <0
-Ahazard function is uniquely determined by the probability density functiom
and vice versa.10
For example, if h(t)/it >0for t >0,the instantaneous conditional
probability of exiting the state increases with the duration of the spell. Iii
a job search model in which the reservation wage declines with the length of an
unemployment spell, we expect to observe positive duration dependence in the
hazard associated with unemployment to employment transitions. On the other hand,
in a model that allows for specific human capital accumulation, we expect to
observe negative duration dependence in the hazard associated with employment
to unemployment transitions. The exponential distribution of duration times is
the only distribution consistent with a hazard function exhibiting no duration
dependence.
It is possible to specify hazard functions that exhibit all three types
of duration dependence for different values of t. In labor economics it is
especially important to allow for nonmonoticity of the hazard since many
economic models have been developed that predict a nonmonotonic hazard
(see, Jovanovic,1979) Our econometric model allows for noninonotonicity
in the hazard in a simple and readily interpretable manner.
In our previous work Flinn and Heckman (1982a) we have demonstrated
the importance of controlling for nonstationary in the environment. While most
theoretical models assume stationarity, our econometric specification does not
impose this frequently counterf actual assumption onto the data. We permit the
hazard function associated with any transition to depend on time varying
explanatory variables. Incorporating time—varying variables into our11
econometric model is computationally burdensome butproves to be essential
in obtaining consistent parameter estimates (see Flinn and Hec1ian(1982a),
Section IV).
The specific functional form for the hazard function that we employ









where is the calendar date at which the current spell began,1k is a
parameter vector conformable with X, the linear and squared duration terms
capture relatively general forms of duration dependence, and Vik represents
( a scalar measure of) the effect of unobserved individual differences on the
state j to state k hazard. The hazard is nonnegative as required. Note that
the time index on X(T. + t. ) indicates that the instantaneous conditional
jk jk
probability of exiting from state j to state k after being in state j for
durationt.at calendar time t.+ t.is a function of current values
jk jk jk
of X. For this specification, there exists no duration dependence in the




=0,we say that there is
'3 ,J '3
positive (negative) duration dependence in the j to k hazard if
>0(p•k
<0).If •k0 then the hazard neednot be monotone.
'3 l,j ,J
We restrict the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity to the jto12
k hazard to be of the form
V.=C.(5,
where the Cikareparameters of the model and (5is an individual specific
spell and time invariant heterogeneity component, the value of which is
unobserved by the analyst. In the estimation procedure, we adopt a random
effects specification and make an assumption concerning the form of F(5),
the cumulative distribution function of (5in the population. The parameters
Cikareidentified up to a factor of proportionality.13
4. Empirical Results And Interpretation
The sample used to perforni the empirical work reported here is selected
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. We follow 122young men
for thirty consecutive months from the time they graduate fromhigh school.
The small size of our sample is due to the stringent selection criteriaimposed.
To be included in the sample an individual must (1) be white; (2). have
received a high school diploma in the spring or early suer of 1969; and
(3) not have returned to school in the period beginning in the fall of 1969
and ending in December of 1971.
The sample was selected in this manner in an attempt to minimize the
initial conditions problem discussed in the literature on applied stochastic
processes (HecIian (1981), Flinn and Heckinan (1982a)).. By using individuals
who have recently completed schooling, we have selected individuals with
little or no previous labor market experience. The vastmajority of individuals
in our sample have not worked in full time jobs during high school. Because
of this, we feel that the initial conditions problem can safely beignored
in deriving the maximumlikelihoodestimates presented here.
Unless duration times follow an exponential distribution, the
distribution of the first spell observed during a sampling period will not have
the same distribution as subsequent spells of the same type whosebeginning
and ending dates are observed. By constructing our sample in themanner indicated
we claim that the first spell sampled follows the same distribution as
subsequent spells of the same type.14
Due to the small number of transitions between the nonemployrnent states
• (u +oand o —'-u)we were not able to obtain estimates of the hazard
functions associated with these transitions. In the three state model we
estimate the parameters of the four hazards associated with the e --o,e -
u-'-e,and o -etransitions. In our test of the two versus three state
model, we estimate three hazard functions by constraining the u +eand
o -ehazards to be equal. Estimation is by maximum likelihood. The
reader is referred to Flinn and Heclanan (1982a) for details concerning the
specification of the likelihood function and estimation procedure.
Table 1 presents estimates of the three state model estimated with
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the transition rates. The observable
characteristics included are the duration of the spell, duration squared (to
allow for nonmonotonic duration dependence), and whether the individual is
married with spouse present (MSP) (1 if yes, 0 if no). The parameterc. is
the factor loading for the state i to state j transition. The unobserved
heterogeneity component is assumed to have a standard normal distribution.
The signs of the parameters are generally consistent with prior
expectations. For example, currently married men have lower rates of transiting
from employment to unemployment than do nonmarried men. The fact that the
standard errors are so large relative to the magnitude of the parameters is to
be expected given that we are attempting to estimate twenty parameters with
so few degrees of freedom. Only the constant terms and the factor loading
associated with the employment to out of the labor force transition are greater
than twice their standard errors.
In Figure 1 the hazard functions from the two nonemployment states to15
L1J.c1
















































































































































employment are plotted for nonmarried (NM) young males who comprise the bulk
of the sample. The hazard functions associated with the out of the labor
force to employment transitions are monotonically increasing, while the hazards
associated with the unemployment to employment transition are norimonotonic.
For nonmarried individuals h >h for the first 6 months of the respective ue oe
nonemployment spells, after which the inequality reverses. The vast bulk of
nonemployment spells are completed in less than six months.
The estimates from the restricted three state model are given in Table
2. Let 2jk =jk1,jk 2,jk C.k)e The restrictions imposed are 0oe
which constrains all parameters in the unemployment to employment and out of the
labor force to employment transitions to equality. There are a total of five
restrictions. Performing the likelihood ratio test on the restricted versus
the unrestricted model, the value of the test statistic is 28.72 which is
distributed x2(5). The critical value for a 5 percent significance level is
11.07. We are able to reject the null hypothesis of the equality of the
parameters governing the two nonemployment states. These empirical results
suggest that out of the labor force and unemployment are not artifical
distinctions for this sample of young men. Because the simpler hypothesis
(2.1) is rejected, it is unnecessary to test the more computationally demanding
proportionality hypothesis (2.2) in order to reject the hypothesis that
unemployment and out of the labor force are behaviorally distinct labor force
states.18
Table 2









































- 1Absolutavalue of asymptotic normal statistics in parentheses.19
Within the framework of job search theory, the fact that over the
empirically relevant range the exit rate from unemployment to employment
exceeds the exit rate from out of the labor force to employment does not
necessarily imply that the rate of arrival of job offers is higher for the
unemployed. In the traditional infinite horizon stationary environment one
state search model, increases in the rate of arrival of job offers increase
the reservation wage and have an ambiguous effect on the exit rate from
unemployment (see equations (A.2)—(A.4) in the Appendix). However, we
demonstrate in the Appendix that if the wage offer distribution is log concave,
higher arrival rates of wage offers imply higher exit rates from unemployment.
The normal distribution is log concave. Other examples of log concave
distributions are given in the Appendix.
Interpreting our findings within the framework of the traditional one
state search model, and assuming log concavity of the wage offer distribution,
our empirical evidence suggests that the rate of arrival of job offers is higher
in the unemployment state than in the out of labor force state. Thus our
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of productive unemployment i.e. that
being unemployed raises the rate of arrival of job offers. However, the
fact that some individuals transit directly from out of the labor force to
employment without first becoming unemployed suggests that job search activity
occurs in both states, and that the difference between the two states is only
a matter of degree of search activity.
An alternative interpretation of the evidence within the traditional
one state search model is that searchers face a positive discount rate and
that the unemployed face a wage offer distribution with a higher mean than do20
those individuals who are out of the labor force.-"'
With a positive discount rate, unit translations of wage offer distribution
produce less than unit changes in the reservation wage. Ceteris paribus,
individuals searching from wage distributions with a higher mean will have
higher exit rates from unemployment than will individuals searching from wage
offer distributions with a lower mean.
Note that this discussion is conducted within a traditional search model.
Within the context of a general three state model, such as the one developed
by Coleman and Hec1ian (1981), log concavity of the wage offer distribution is
not sufficient to ensure that a higher rate of arrivals of wage offers in
a state produces a higher exit rate from the state to employment. The conclusions
in the text hold in a two state model. See theAppendix.21
5. ConclusiOn
In this paper we have constructed a test of the proposition that the
nonemployment states "unemployment" and "out of the labor force" are
behaviorally indistinguishable. Our empirical results indicate that
unemployment and out of the labor force are behaviorally distinct, so that
in general it is not legitimate to aggregate the two states into a single
nonemploynent state when analyzing labor market dynamics. Our test is
conducted using a flexible econometric model. We are confident that rejection
of the two state (employment and nonemployment) model is not attributable to
arbitrary functional form assumptions..i'
Rejecting the behavioral equivalence of unemployment and out of the
labor force suggests that the task of building economic models that predict
such a distinction is an empirically fruitful one. In. Plinn and Heclonan (l982b)
and Coleman and Heckman (1981) we present a three state model of search
unemployment that is consistent with the empirical evidence reported in this
paper.
-Evenafter allowing for alternative distributions of the unobserved
heterogeneity component ô, we overwhelmingly reject the two state model.22
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A SUFFICIENT CONDITIONFOR THE EXITPATE FROMUNMFLOYMENT TO
BE ANINCREASING FUNCTION OFTHE RATE OF ARRIVAL OF JOB OFFERS.
Let wage offers arrive in accordance with a homogenous Poisson
process with parameter X. The discount rate is denoted by r, r(0,1).
F(w) is the cdf of wage offers. The cost of search is c, c >0.Accepted
jobs last forever, the environment is stationary, and agents have infinite
lifetimes. It is well known that in this model, the optimal search strategy
has the reservation wage property if w has a finite absolute first moment
(see Flinn and Heclcnan, (1982a)). The reservation wage R is the solution
to the following equation
(A.1) c + r =X/rI(x—R)dF(x) for R >0.
R
If the R that solves (A.1) is negative, the agent doesn't search.
The exit rate from unemployment, h, is
h =X(1—F(R))
(see, e.g., Flinn and Hecknan, 1982a).
Proposition: In a one state infinite horizon continuous time job search
model of unemployment with exponential arrival times of wage offers, a
sufficient condition for an increase in the rate of arrival of wage offers
to produce an increase in the exit rate from unemployment is that the wage
offer distribution be log concave (i.e., that the hazard rate associated with
the wage offer distribution be increasing in wages).A- 2
Proof: Assume F(w) is absolutely continuous and nondefective F(w) 1).
The derivative of h with respect to A is
(A.2) =(1—F(R))—Xf(R)
Differentiating (A.l) with respect to A, assuming R >0,
--hrI(l—F(x))dx
R
(A.3) =i+ Air (1-F(r))
where we have used the well known fact (see, e.g., Ross, 1970) that
f(x- R)dF(x)=I(1-F(x))dx
R R






A sufficient condition for (A.4) to be positive is that the term
in brackets inside the braces be non—negative.
(A.5) [(1 -F(R))-f(R) 1(1 -F(x))dx] 0
It is convenient to characterize the wage offer distribution by
the hazard g(u) which exists by virtue of the absolute continuity of F.
We define
(A.6) 1 -F(x)=exp(-fg(u)du)
It is convenient to work with c(R) which is defined asA-3
x
(R) f(1—F(x))dx=1exp(— f g(u)du)dx
R R
Using this notation condition (A.5) may be rewritten as
(A.5)' -(R)+ ::R)>




andmultiplication of (A. 7) by ((R))2/"(R) produces (A.5)' since '(R) <0.
By a theorem of Brascamp and Lieb (1976), as reported in Pratt (1981),
a sufficient condition for in (x) to be concave is that in "(x) be
concave, i.e., that
x in (x) -fg(u)du
be concave in x. Assuming g(u) is differentiable, strict concavity
requires that g'(x) >0,i.e., that the hazard is increasing. This
condition is satisfied if the iog of the density of w is concave (see Barlow
and Proschan, 1975). Examples of log concave densities include normal,
exponential, LaPlace, and for certain parameter values (see Barlow and Proschan,
1975, p.79) truncated normal, Weibull and Ganmia densities. A Cauchy distribution
is not log concave nor is a log normal distribution.A-4
Log concavity of the wage offer density is also a sufficient condition
for the exit rate from unemployment to be an increasing function of the rate
of arrival of job offers in a simple two state equilibrium model of labor
market dynamics. The setup is essentially the same as in the one spell search
model except that individuals are terminated from employment spells at an
exogenously determined rate a. This model is discussed at length and estimated
in Flinn and Hec1ian (1982b). The reservation wage Rin that model is given
by the implicit function
(A.8) R =— c+ ra (x—R)dF(x),
where Rr Vu and Vis the value of occupying the unemployment state.
We could repeat the proof given above for the one spell search model to verify
sufficiency of the log concavity condition for the two state model but the
similarity between A.l and A.8 is too obvious to warrant a detailed derivation.